🧠 Takeaways:
Warby Parker has no right trading at 4x Revenue with 8% YoY growth running $100m share buy backs. Someone is asleep at the wheel.
Stop w/ Buyback nonsense. Fund Retail growth.
License more brand deals to draw more collabs.
Go direct to employers and TPAs skip the insurance monopoly
+ Write a Quarterly Update
LBAB Community: Write a Quarterly Update
You’ll here this advice from incredibly successful founder who have raised money and scaled businesses.
Always write quarterly updates summarizing your progress, what you worked on and what your focus for next quarter is.
Send it to people you trust and would want to get feedback from.
Even if you write it to yourself. Build the email and send it. The value of doing this is similar to journalling or writing Quarterly analysis.
Every quarter I write our investors an update on:
Performance summary
Wins
Challenges
Finances Updates
Sales Updates
Next Quarter focus
My Asks of them.
It takes 3 hours to pull all the data and write the email and it’s a Top 5 most valuable activity of the quarter.
If you don’t already send these updates start this quarter. If you feel comfortable send them to me. Happy to help where I can, but more importantly so you start writing them.
Let’s Examine This Biz
Note: As always, none of what follows is legal, tax, investing, financial, or any other sort of advice. And I was never here 😉.
Warby Parker's (the DTC poster child disrupting the monopolistic eyewear market) has grown up to realize they need to become everything they set out to fight.
They aren’t playing as well or with as many resources and are caught in the awkward middle.
Today we’re walking through what Warby needs to do to become a $6B biz, but passing on this insanely overvalued stock.
Financial Summary
Stock price: $26.41
Market Cap: $3.23B
L5 Performance: -6.3%
P/E Ratio: 2,771x
FY 2025 Financial Statements (YoY Comparison)
Rev: $871.9M (+13%) 😐
Gross Profits: $470.6M (+10%) 👎
OPEX: $475.9M (+4%) 👍
Net Income: $1.6M (+108%) 👍
FCF: $43.7M +34%) 👏
TLDR Analysis: Growth at the cost of the thing that made them special
Rev +13% but decelerating 🤢
Gross margin has fallen so much it’s lower than their retail partner. 🤢🤢
OPEX finally hitting leverage
What do you expect when you buy back $100M in stock vs. investing $67m in retail capex in the same year.
This is a crime for an early stage biz. They should have put the full $167m into the CAPEX engine that;s firing. Not propping up their over inflated stock.
They aren’t growing fast or profitable. It’s only a matter of time before this stock hits a wall.
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Let’s TLDR This Biz:
Founded:
2010 by Neil Blumenthal, Dave Gilboa, Andrew Hunt, and Jeffrey Raider (Wharton MBA). Started as the online answer to a $500 pair of glasses.
Aha Moment:
2010, realized one company controlled most of the industry and glasses cost way more than they should. Sold $95 glasses online, shipped 5 pairs to try at home first.
Insight: eyewear pricing was a monopoly tax, not a manufacturing cost.
Growth:
Stores, not ecommerce. 323 locations now, 47 net new in FY25, the highest count on record.
Store productivity runs ~$3,000/sqft.
Insurance penetration up 40% YoY, still small at 8.3% of rev.
Model:
Vertically integrated DTC eyewear. Own the frame design, own the lens finishing, sell direct.
Retail is now the growth engine, not ecommerce.
Depends on continued store productivity and insurance channel access.
Where We Are Now:
IPO'd via direct listing in 2021.
Stock down to $26.41 after Blumenthal sold 87% of his stake near the highs.
Market's stuck between "growth stock" and "mature retailer" pricing, and the fundamentals just voted mature retailer.
Let’s Fix This Biz
Here are the 3 ways we get Warby Parker back to growth and be a $6B stock.
1) Kill the Buyback, Fund the Stores
I hate this buyback. $100M to shrink the share count while retail capex, the one engine that's actually working, gets $67M?

There’s an easy case to fund more Warby Parker owned stores.
At the current $1.4M/store implied capex rate, that's ~71 more doors on top of the 50 already planned for 2026.
If we use the blended Rev avg at $2.7M rev/store, that's ~$192M in run-rate rev, worth roughly $576M in EV at a 3x rev multiple.
How on God’s green earth is buying back $100m in stock increase the stock price more than adding $576m from Retail sales growth?
That’s before we get to the bigger opportunity. Expanding into Target Optical.
Luxottica powers 500 Target Opticals, out of Target’s total 2k stores.
Warby rolled out 5 more Warby inside of Target stores last year.
Take that $100M and sign a real multi-year door count with Target.
License the format to independent optometrists.
Retail is working for Warby. But they’re buying back stock????
Seems like the pencil pushers have invaded the board.
Takeaway: Growth brands don’t buy back stock. That’s for bizs that ran out of ideas.
2) MORE Character Collabs
This is my favorite move in the whole issue. Liscence the famous glasses from your favorite characters.
They've already run a Marvel Spider-Man 2 collection drop.

Luxottica owns the luxury eyewear brands. Warby can own your favorite characters frames:
Harry Potter
Clark Kent
Velma from Scooby Doo
Meg Murray (Wrinkle in Time)
Walter White
Limited drops with built in pricing power since someone will spend more for their favorite characters. Halloween would become its own shopping event.
Every time a movie comes out drop the relevant line. Kids will go crazy for it and Mom/Dad will have to get the matching pair.
At Warby’s price point the fastest way to grow is convincing customers they need to buy 3-4 pairs for fashion. Vs 1 great pair that last year.
Takeaway: Become the Hasbro of glasses.
3) Triple down on Insurance
The eyewear insurance market is a complete monopoly. To quickly explain the player when a consumer wants to buy a pair of glasses. TL;DR Luxxottica currently owns it all.

Warby has been rebuilding components:
They offer in store Eye exams.
They’re going direct to insurers now.
They have their own retail stores.
Where you select frames + lenses (they don’t make the lenses)
Pay direct. Historically out of pocket.
Warby’s efforts to go direct to insurance providers is working. Insurance related rev is <20% of overall, but +40% YoY, but EyeMed (owned by Luxottica) + VSP, the two biggest networks in the country, are still closed to them.
Warby doesn’t have time to wait out the the pending antitrust suit alleging EyeMed steers patients straight to Luxottica's own stores.
Instead of waiting through the slog Warby can go direct to employers and benefits administrators instead. Skip the insurance providers entirely and work with the companies providing the direct value to consumers.
If that unlocks even 15-20% more growth on top of the existing insurance trajectory, that's $15-20M in incremental rev, roughly $45-60M in EV. And this model is a lock in where over a decade it compounds and will become a main drivers of their rev.
Takeaway: You can't build a moat renting space in your rival's castle.
Final Thought
Warby Parker is living its own Dark Knight feeling (Die a hero of live long enough to see yourself become a villain).
Last year they killed Home Try-On, because it wasn't profitable.
Literally the tactic that launched the brand, DTC and everyone’s faith that you can disrupt the legacy incumbent with free shipping and returns.
Is now officially dead.
It’s nice every once in a while to take a victory lap. Almost exactly a year ago I said they’d have to pick. Retail expansion or running all of the DTC value props. And Bullet point #1 was the Try at home program.
The scrappy disruptor is now:
A Retail heavy biz
Launching partner products with Google and Samsung.
Killing innovative marketing techniques that everyone copied.
Moving into Insurance partnerships and layered complicated B2B relationships.
I’m not disagreeing with any of these tactics.
Insurance partnerships are the right move.
Retail is where most consumers buy glasses.
Google or Samsung would be an incredible home.
This brand isn’t growing or profitable anymore to take on the 10k lb elephant in the market.
The Try at Home tactic that got them here clearly wasn’t going to get them to where they need to be.
Neither will $100m buybacks, but that’s why we should be the captain now.


